Introduction
There are many historical examples of U.S. military advisory missions and specific applications of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations conducted by Special Operations Forces (SOF). However, there is little research that looks at the effects of changes in the current operating environment and current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan on the application of FID operations conducted by SOF. A detailed understanding of the application of FID conducted by SOF and conventional military advisory duties within the current operating environment should assist civilian and military leaders with the doctrinal employment of these different mission sets.
In order to enable commanders and staff planners to doctrinally employ SOF within the FID task, FID operations conducted by SOF and conventionally conducted foreign military advisory efforts must remain separate missions.
Foreign Internal Defense is not simply synonymous with other forms of military advisement under the umbrella of Nation Assistance (NA). For a better understanding of the problem, further deconstruction of the forms and logic of the function of Nation Assistance must occur. Nation Assistance is defined as…, "civil or military assistance, other than Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within a nation's territory during peacetime, crises, emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation".
1 Nation Assistance programs include, but are not limited to, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA), Security Assistance (SA), and Foreign Internal
Defense. Therefore these programs are doctrinally accepted forms that serve the function of Nation Assistance.
Security Assistance "refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, FID is the major military to military advisory effort under National Assistance. This paper examines the SOF legislatively mandated FID task in the current operating environment.
The term FID is a program or set of programs, a task within the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), a legislatively directed activity, a core task for SOF, and a type of operation. Uncompromising debates sometimes occur between individuals looking at FID through different lenses. This paper refers to FID as a legislatively directed activity for U.S. SOF. 4 The joint military definition of FID is "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." th Cong., (October 1, 1986) .
U.S. combat forces performing FID during combat operations. A specific emphasis will be placed on foreign internal defense conducted by Special Operations Forces.
The Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) has created the need for a massive military advisory effort. This requirement creates friction with the logic behind the FID task.
However, the emerging doctrine of Security Force Assistance (SFA) is being sold as providing the capability for such an enterprise endeavor. Developed by the Joint Center for International Security Forces Assistance, SFA is another form of military to military advisory effort under NA that may relieve the friction and help fulfill a nation's military advisory needs. What differentiates between FID and SFA as forms of military advisement is the logic behind them.
SFA is defined as "all United States government actions taken in concert with a host nation to generate, employ, transition and sustain the host nation's security forces in support of their national requirements, U.S. Theater Security Cooperation plans, operations and contingency plans, campaigns, and operations". 6 Part of the logic that differentiates SFA from FID is that SFA deals with both external and internal threats to the nation. The most significant differentiation is scope. Properly planned at the combatant command level, forces conducting SFA can construct or reconstruct foreign security forces from the ground up, if necessary. Part of this monograph will identify the logic behind FID and then compare that with the emerging concept of SFA.
The foundation for the military application of FID is found in the national strategic documents and speeches that encompass the Nixon (Guam) Doctrine. to determine the effects of all these changes in concepts on the application of SOF FID.
The criteria that will be applied to the research question are a set of doctrinally based FID prerequisites. These prerequisites allow a comparison between a historical FID example and a contemporary FID operation. These prerequisites are: determining if the FID operation is a necessary SOF mission, U.S. military assistance is requested by the host nation, the threat to the host nation is internal, the host nation has or is willing to create an Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy, and the host nation is providing the preponderance of forces.
Additionally, when considering the application of SOF to conduct FID operations, planners
should add an analysis of SOF unique capabilities in addition to the above FID prerequisites. The Cold War, the end of the war in Vietnam, and President Nixon's National Security Strategy set the backdrop for the current concepts for FID. Specifically, the Nixon Doctrine, as part of the Nixon Administration's national security policy of "Realistic Deterrence", had a large impact on shaping the contemporary application of FID. Historically, the strong national opinion against the war in Vietnam and the costs of direct involvement in what was ultimately a proxy war between the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War led President Nixon to seek other avenues of foreign policy implementation. One of the main efforts was the promotion of military assistance to allied nations. A key component of the military assistance was the caveat that the administration placed a heavy emphasis on indirect U.S. military presence with a prerequisite that the host nation (HN) provides the preponderance of forces for its own self-defense.
The indirect nature of military troop presence and involvement, the preponderance of host nation forces, and military assistance as a way to further achieve national security have been the cornerstone prerequisites for the concept of FID since its inception.
12 Within these foundational requirements, the United States provided military assistance to allied states in an attempt to counter global communism. The U.S. military involvement in the civil war in El
Salvador from 1981 to 1993 is an excellent example of U.S. FID operations that followed a set of doctrinally based FID prerequisites.
The Nunn-Cohen amendment to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act legislatively directed
Foreign Internal Defense as a core task for U.S. Special Operations Forces. 13 From that time until the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the majority of U.S. SOF led FID operations were in direct support, not involving combat, providing training and advisory assistance to a host nation. The majority of these programs involved, joint and multinational exercises, exchange programs, and humanitarian demining. However, the post 9/11 security environment created a change to the indirect nature of military assistance. In practice, U.S. foreign policy shifted from nation assistance to nation building and thus changed the nature of FID application. However, little attention has been paid to the evolution of FID from its foundational start in the Nixon Administration to the current National Security Strategy. A foundational understanding of applicable U.S. national security policies, the evolution of US SOF with regard to FID being identified as a core task, and the emergence of FID doctrine within the military will provide a baseline of understanding for further historical analysis. There has been a point of change within our security environment which should cause our civilian and military leaders to re-evaluate their understanding of FID operations and the application of military forces within that effort.
This chapter analyzes the international relations environment and national security This chapter will frame the political issues surrounding the U.S. involvement in El Salvador and provide a brief background history of the civil war in El Salvador. This chapter will use the doctrinally based FID prerequisites, originally presented in the introduction, chapter in the historical analysis of El Salvador to evaluate whether or not a FID operation was conducted according to doctrine. A final overall analysis will determine if the FID operation in El Salvador was in fact a good baseline to compare against other case studies in FID.
The Reagan Doctrine as a continuance of the Monroe Doctrine drove the United States' involvement in El Salvador. 28 The protection of the Western Hemisphere in this instance was specifically against the further spread of Communism. The United States did not want another 28 Reagan Doctrine refers to the compilation of national security policies and strategies under President Ronald Reagan. The Monroe Doctrine refers to the U.S. doctrine presented under President James Monroe that declared that European powers could no longer colonize the American continent and that the United States would take an active role in enforcing that policy and in protection of the Western Hemisphere. Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine 1945 -1993 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994 This paper has argued that certain doctrinally based prerequisites ought to exist prior to implementation of a FID operation. The first prerequisite is SOF specific and is taken from the SOF operational mission criteria. It is imperative that commanders and SOF planners evaluate every consideration for the employment SOF.
33 Therefore, the first FID prerequisite is to determine if the advisory mission is appropriate for SOF. Second, it is imperative that the host nation request U.S. military assistance versus receiving outside help involuntarily. Third, the threat to the host nation is internal with regard to the application of a Foreign Internal Defense operations or programs. Fourth, the host nation must have or is willing to create an IDAD strategy as a plan to combat the internal threat. Lastly, the host nation should provide the preponderance of forces to counter the threat.
As already stated, FID is a core task for SOF but FID is not the sole domain of SOF. As with every SOF operation, commanders and planners must ensure that the assigned mission is appropriate for SOF. The primary role of SOF in FID is to "train, advise, and assist host nation work closely with a host nation commander. One of the specific tasks for the advisors was to improve human rights. This delicate situation required personnel that were trained in how to deal with host nation commanders that are suspicious of anyone looking over their shoulders. The small pool of qualified officers and enlisted advisors resulted in soldiers having multiple tours in El Salvador, which strengthened rapport with the host nation personnel, maintained a high degree of cultural awareness and provided unparalleled continuity for the mission.
A second prerequisite is that the host nation requests U.S. military assistance as apposed to a forced or coerced U.S. intervention. It is evident that President Reagan understood the policies and lessons learned from the Vietnam War in his approach to an intervention in El Salvador. It is apparent that although skeptical because of culturally sensitive issues, like human rights violations, the ESAF acknowledged the need for U.S. military advisory assistance to combat the growing insurgency. Although critical to the protection of the Western Hemisphere, U.S. assistance was gradually presented to the government of El Salvador initially through economic aid and then through military advisement.
36
Another prerequisite for Foreign Internal Defense is that the threat to the host nation is internal. When supporting a nation's IDAD strategy, the FID intervention is ideally preemptive but may become an active strategy to combat insurgency, illicit drugs, terror, or other internal threats.
37 El Salvador had in recent history suffered from poor governance and a military coup.
These conditions gave rise to opposition guerrilla bands that were individually ineffective. Ultimately, the government in El Salvador was not overturned by a communist revolution. Although the U.S. FID intervention in El Salvador cannot be considered the sole cause for successfully defeating the insurgency, it was definitely a contributing factor. Academic arguments attribute overall success to government reforms that eventually eroded the people's desire to side with the insurgents. A key part of that government reform was the professionalization of the military via U.S. FID which improved human rights abuses and overall counterinsurgency capabilities. Not only was the FID intervention successful but it also followed the doctrinally based prerequisites.
In summary, the FID mission in El Salvador was an appropriate mission for SOF personnel. The training of indigenous personnel on counterinsurgency operations was, and still is, a core mission for U.S. Special Forces. The government of El Salvador both requested U.S. direct military support and was able to develop an IDAD strategy in the form of a national military strategy that addressed how to combat the growing insurgency. A Foreign Internal Defense operation was a logically applicable intervention because the nature of the threat was internal.
Finally, the MILGROUP cap on advisory personnel ensured the U.S. military personnel did not take a lead combat role and forced the ESAF to provide the preponderance for forces for the defense of their country.
By applying a suggested set of doctrinally based FID prerequisites to a historical FID operation in El Salvador, we gained an understanding of the importance of those prerequisites. Each political organization provided an equal number of recruits to ensure that all political parties were equally represented across the battalion structure. This forced political integration was an initial attempt to break down sectarianism within the new Iraqi security forces.
The intent was to produce well-trained, physically fit men that served a nation and not just one The next prerequisite for Foreign Internal Defense requires the threat to the host nation actually be internal. Doctrinally, a FID intervention supports an IDAD strategy that prevents or combats insurgency, illicit drugs, terror or some other internal threat.
49 Ideally the FID intervention should be preemptive, however the foundation of the military advisory mission in Iraq was far from ideal. There were both internal and external threats to the transitional government in Iraq. There was not an external threat in the conventional sense of another state's army invading Iraq. However, porous borders allowed external state sponsored and non-state actors to contribute to lawlessness, terrorist activities, and the insurgency. The external threat facing Iraq put a greater strain on the FID operations conducted by SOF.
This blending of external and internal threats took many forms. Violence from elements of the former regime, anti-coalition and anti-Iraqi violence, sectarian violence, terrorist acts from radical Muslim groups, and other destabilizing actions threatened the stability of Iraq. Therefore, the FID mission in Iraq was not a preemptive situation. It was more describable as a powder keg of many hostile actors. Any confusion on the identity of the actual threat was accompanied by further confusion on how to combat the threat. Confusion on how to combat this web of threat was exacerbated by a lack of an Internal Defense and Development strategy from the Iraqi government.
Another important prerequisite is the fact that the host nation has or is willing to create an IDAD strategy. This IDAD strategy is the blueprint for how to combat the identified internal threat potentially using all elements of national power from both supported and supporting Sadly, these accomplishments were not overtly exploited via military information operations.
Utilizing information operations to exploit the 36th ICDC battalion success was a priority task for USSF advisors during operations in Fallujah. One detachment utilized newspaper reporters to help exploit the fact that the 36th ICDC was the only Iraqi security force that was fighting in Fallujah. A few press articles were positive and helped spread the success of the 36th
ICDC Battalion in open source news but it was basically small news. The fact that no American or Iraqi headquarters or government body fully understood the correct employment of the special unit or how to exploit their successes is one symptom of an absent, incomplete and/or nonproliferated IDAD strategy.
The last prerequisite requires that the host nation provide the preponderance of forces toward their internal defense. The decision to disband the Iraqi Army and all its structure had significant implication on the application of FID. Special Forces detachments had to establish an entire battalion sized unit and the entire infrastructure from nothing while simultaneously conducting combat operations. This was perhaps the prerequisite with the largest amount of consequences and the next discussion is on the consequences of not meeting these prerequisites.
The following discussion will demonstrate the strains of developing a unit from virtually nothing on the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha using the DOTMLPF construct. that completed the initial training to make up the core of the unit were fit for special operations duties. Because of operational security, force protection and loyalty reasons, USSF advisors desired to place these men in combat support roles to allow them to continue to serve in the special operations unit. The challenge to the USSF advisors was additional training, command structure, organization and integration of these additional support troops. In summary, the USSF advisors quickly identified voids in the initial unit organization but had to implement recommended changes almost by themselves in an attempt to maintain continuous combat readiness and effectiveness.
(Training) The short initial training period prior to deeming the unit fully operational has already been discussed within this paper. After the core body of the unit received their six days of conventional led Initial Entry Training and ten days of SOF led training, the unit was deemed fully operational. After which, training mostly came in the form of on-the-job training and was concurrent with combat operations. Because there was a need to maintain continuous combat operations the advisors implemented an operational tempo cycle that allowed for rapid response.
The cycles facilitated combat employment, better unit training time management, and allowed for leave time. What was lacking in training was the need for a special selection process after the initial training and additional USSF advisor support, neither was received. Also, the responsibility for basic entry training of those recruits selected off the street fell on the U.S. advisors. This requirement fell on top of the advanced skills training, selection, staff training, officer, and noncommissioned officer training already being conducted. The few that had served as officers in the former Iraqi Army did not serve at the field grade rank and had not received training that prepared them for command by their own country's standards.
The same held true for the non-commissioned officer corps. The U.S. advisors were in desperate need of professional officer and non-commissioned officer school support from the conventional forces. The unit did receive an allotment of slots for these professional development schools but they did not meet the demand and still had to be augmented with additional SOF training. The USSF advisors also had to absorb the requirement to train on other important areas such as staff skills, military justice, and rules of engagement. closer look may reveal that a number of these failed or failing states have internal threats. There is also a high probability that these countries do not have any sort of IDAD strategy to combat their internal threats. Although these countries seem eligible for FID assistance, many of these countries may have active insurgent activities past the initial phase, which is counter to the underlying preemptive nature of FID support to a country's IDAD strategy.
Another fact that has significant bearing on the topics under discussion is that over 85 The purpose of this paper was not to argue that we should rigidly remain with doctrine.
On the contrary, we should understand doctrine, its logic, and origins to assess if it is still relevant in the contemporary environment. If not, then we must endeavor to change doctrine to make it more applicable. Any doctrinal change recommendations will be left for further research and are not within the scope of this monograph. Furthermore, the protection of "rice bowls" was also not in the purview of this paper. FID is not the sole domain of Special Operations Forces. Certain advisory missions meet the recommended FID prerequisites argued within this paper and other advisory missions exceed or strain the capabilities of SOF. To clarify the point made in the Army's new field manual on COIN, military advisement is a "Big Army" mission but that does not necessarily imply FID. 57 General and special purpose forces must understand their roles in FID, limited FID, and Security Force Assistance within the current operating environment.
The violation of one of the suggested prerequisites does not imply the absolute exclusion of SOF. If SOF are absolutely imperative for the advisory mission but one of the suggested prerequisites cannot be met, commanders and planners should adjust for that area that is lacking.
There must be an application of art in the adjustment of doctrine to deal with the consequences of th Commando Battalion and subsequent FID operations involving combat were phenomenal successes. However, that success is more attributable to the "can do" attitude of the SOF operators and less to a textbook example of the conditions set for successful FID operations.
FID prerequisites must be applied during the troop to task assessment when considering SOF for an advisory mission. If these prerequisites aren't met, then commanders and planners must mitigate any negative consequences that arise. If the advisory mission is more applicable to conventional forces then they should be considered for limited FID operations. If a large-scale advisory mission requires building a foreign army from virtually nothing, the conventional forces should be given Security Force Assistance as their task. Ultimately, this is an economy of force issue that seeks to recommend the best use of a limited resource. 
